Abstract

In reaction to the classical philosophical idea of a free transcendental subject, contemporary philosophers generally reject the idea of the free subject altogether on the grounds that it is only the residue of the outmoded metaphysical tradition. For these philosophers, human beings are basically determined by the overarching social structures of language or power. In this dissertation, I advance the idea of a "mediating" subject, which bounces to neither of these extremes, by considering the works of Jean-Paul Sartre and Theodor W. Adorno, who, I argue, embrace this position. ;The idea of a mediating subjectivity is one which conceives of the subject from both of these perspectives. The viewpoint of consciousness, which requires us to experience ourselves as free agents in the world, is neither less nor more substantial than the sociohistorical viewpoint. Instead, subjectivity formation must be comprehended as the result of a dialectical interplay between these first and third person viewpoints. Although Sartre's phenomenological approach starts from the viewpoint of consciousness and Adorno's sociohistorical approach starts from the viewpoint of a compromised historical dialectic, both tacitly incorporate not only the opposite viewpoint into the very essence of their thought, but also progressively build toward that viewpoint in their later works. I therefore seek to bring their complementary positions into a productive tension. ;In Part One, I consider Adorno's critique of the phenomenological and existential traditions to lay the groundwork for showing that his critical analyses of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Husserl are not apposite with respect to Sartre's existential phenomenology. In Part Two, I explicate the ways in which Sartre breaks with this tradition, and seek to rebut the scattered criticisms that Adorno and other members of the Frankfurt School level against his thought. I conclude this part with an extensive analysis of the idea of a mediating subjectivity in Sartre's early thought. Finally, in Part Three, I consider Adorno's sociohistorical analysis of subjectivity formation, and attempt to show that his critiques all presuppose a mediating subject whose freedom has, historically, been betrayed.