Metaphorical pluralism – not on the substantive level!

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):164-165 (1998)
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Abstract

Koriat & Goldsmith (1996t) present two different programs for memory research. Different though they are on the methodological level, on the substantive level the two programs are based on the same view, according to which memory consists of represented information that is permanently stored in the mind (or brain). This view is, I think, wrong. One can support the methodological pluralism Koriat & Goldsmith advocate, but on the substantive level pluralism is not admissible.

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Citations of this work

The roots of remembering: Radically enactive recollecting.Daniel D. Hutto & Anco Peeters - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 97-118.
Is my Memory an Extended Notebook?Paul Loader - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):167-184.

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