E Does Not Equal K

The Reasoner 7:30-31 (2013)
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Abstract

This paper challenges Williamson's "E = K" thesis on the basis of evidential practice. The main point is that most evidence is only approximately true and so cannot be known if knowledge is factive.

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Michael Shaffer
Gustavus Adolphus College

Citations of this work

Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):121-134.

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References found in this work

Truthlikeness.G. Oddie - 2005 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. New York: Routledge. pp. 478--488.

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