Believing at Will

In Felicia Ackerman (ed.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 36–52 (1981) Copy BIBT_EX

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believing at will –forming a belief intentionally “commitment‐constituted attitude” “Controlling Attitudes” – we cannot believe or intend at will “Answerability” – matter of subjection to standards of justification or warrant Intentional belief‐formation – the first grade of voluntary belief “becoming more confident” “change in view” –happening without intentional involvement “judgement,” “deduction,” “abstraction,”

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9781444307276 9781405191456

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10.1002/9781444307276.ch3

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