Collins’s incorrect depiction of Dreyfus’s critique of artificial intelligence

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):301-308 (2008)
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Abstract

Harry Collins interprets Hubert Dreyfus’s philosophy of embodiment as a criticism of all possible forms of artificial intelligence. I argue that this characterization is inaccurate and predicated upon a misunderstanding of the relevance of phenomenology for empirical scientific research

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Evan Selinger
Rochester Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Interactional Imogen: language, practice and the body.Harry Collins - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (5):933-960.

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