A Hybrid Theory of Induction

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
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Abstract

There are two important traditions in the philosophy of induction. According to one tradition, which has dominated for the last couple of centuries, inductive arguments are warranted by rules. Bayesianism is the most popular view within this tradition. Rules of induction provide functional accounts of inductive support, but no rule is universal; hence, no rule is by itself an accurate model of inductive support. According to another tradition, inductive arguments are not warranted by rules but by matters of fact. Norton’s material theory of induction (MTI) is an influential view within this tradition. Norton’s MTI fails to provide an account of inductive support, but it provides a good account of inductive warrant that can help us define the domain of validity of each rule of induction. Despite their limitations, both approaches to induction are illuminating important aspects of how relations of inductive support work. In this article I present a hybrid theory of induction (HTI), in which I acknowledge and articulate the role of both rules and matters of fact in our understanding of inductive support. According to the HTI, rules of induction accurately describe relations of inductive support when they are warranted, and a rule of induction is warranted if the right facts about the matter of the induction obtain. Crucially, the HTI allows us to address the main challenges that each tradition faces while retaining their strengths, thus obtaining a functional and accurate account of inductive support. The HTI also provides a useful general framework to examine and understand induction, to make sense of how different rules of induction can coexist and to tackle some problems in epistemology. Moreover, the HTI allows us to clarify and resolve some current debates on induction, like the apparent divide between Norton and rule-based theorists.

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Adrià Segarra
Cambridge University

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References found in this work

Ontological relativity and other essays.Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.) - 1969 - New York: Columbia University Press.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.
The material theory of induction.John D. Norton - 2021 - Calgary, Alberta, Canada: University of Calgary Press.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.

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