Abstract

In the valuable information – selective torture equilibrium occurring under both questioning types, the Cooperative Detainee provides information satisfying the Interrogator, who therefore does not torture afterwards. She does, however, torture a Detainee who does not provide information because she believes that the Detainee is Resistant rather than Innocent when a Detainee fails to reveal anything valuable. In other words, the equilibrium depends on torturing an Innocent Detainee for telling the truth of his innocence. After locating this equilibrium in the parameter space, the chapter investigates the equilibrium’s formal properties and uses these to identify multiple trade-offs between information and torture and even a paradox in the logic of interrogational torture. The chapter illustrates the equilibrium with two case studies, one of the Gafgen kidnapping case in Germany and one of a CIA detainee named Pasha Wazir, before returning to the model.