Torturing Innocents, Resisting Torture

In Does Torture Work? Oxford University Press USA (2015)
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Abstract

The two equilibria discussed in this chapter also occur under both types of questioning. In the no information, torture equilibrium, no Detainee type provides information and the Interrogator tortures as a result. In the no information, no torture equilibrium, once again no Detainee type provides information, but the Interrogator does not torture because she believes no or false information signals an Innocent Detainee. Following the parameter space illustrations and discussion of the equilibria’s formal properties, the chapter provides two case studies. The first is Khaled El-Masri an innocent German citizen kidnapped and tortured by the CIA and the second is the extraordinarily resistant Henri Alleg, a newspaper editor tortured by French paratroopers in Algeria during the Battle of Algiers.

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