Abstract

It is a remarkable feature of language, and of human understanding, that the same word refers to various individual objects. This is most evident in the case of generic terms . For example, the word 'tree' may apply to one tree in one instance and another in another instance. Because the word applies to different individuals in each case, yet the same cognition "x is a tree" is present, the question arises, "of what object does the word convey knowledge?" In studying their discussions on this topic, the present dissertation translates Patanjali on Panini 1.2.58 and 1.2.64, Vatsyayana on Gautama 2.2.58-69, and Sabara on the Akrtyadhikarana. ;Patanjali considers the merits, difficulties, and philosophical presuppositions of the extreme views that a word denotes just an individual and that it denotes just a generic property. If a word naturally denotes whatever individual objects it refers to, one cannot account for the occurrence of the same cognition regarding each. The same cognition regarding each of many individuals of a kind is explained as based on a generic property present in each. But if a generic term denotes as a single generic property, one cannot account for linguistic usages reflecting the comprehension of distinction in number, differences in quality, or participation in action, all of which naturally belong to individuals. Because the same cognition and knowledge of distinction, etc. are both present when a generic term is used, Patanjali concludes that the word denotes both the generic property and an individual. In Nyaya, Gautama, as explained by Vatsyayana, favors this solution too. He includes shape as a third element denoted because it is a means to infer the generic property. Sabara affirms that a generic property alone is denoted, demonstrates that cognition of a generic property must derive directly from the word, and explains how cognition of an individual derives from cognition of the generic property. Though his explanation is feasible, his proofs that an individual is not also denoted, depending on a doubtful example and biased application of presumption, are vulnerable