Expressivism concerning epistemic modals

Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):601-615 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I develop a new argument for an expressivist account of epistemic modals, which starts from a puzzle about epistemic modals which Seth Yalcin recently presented. I reject Yalcin's own solution to the puzzle, and give a better explanation based on expressivism concerning epistemic modals. I also address two alleged problems for expressivism: do embeddings of epistemic modals pose a serious threat to expressivism, and how can expressivism account for disagreements about statements containing epistemic modals?

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,528

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Hard cases for combining expressivism and deflationist truth: Conditionals and epistemic modals.Mark Schroeder - forthcoming - In Steven Gross & Michael Williams (eds.), (unknown). Oxford University Press.
More on epistemic modals.Seth Yalcin - 2009 - Mind 118 (471):785-793.
Embedding Epistemic Modals.Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):867-914.
Wondering what might be.Moritz Schulz - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):367 - 386.
Being for: evaluating the semantic program of expressivism.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Mark Schroeder.
Suppose Yalcin is wrong about epistemic modals.Joshua D. Crabill - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):625-635.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-08-04

Downloads
241 (#74,118)

6 months
7 (#172,568)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Benjamin Schnieder
University of Vienna

Citations of this work

Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.
Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.
Weak Assertion.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):741-770.
Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.

View all 25 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references