Semantic expressivism for epistemic modals

Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (2):475-511 (2021)
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Abstract

Expressivists about epistemic modals deny that ‘Jane might be late’ canonically serves to express the speaker’s acceptance of a certain propositional content. Instead, they hold that it expresses a lack of acceptance. Prominent expressivists embrace pragmatic expressivism: the doxastic property expressed by a declarative is not helpfully identified with that sentence’s compositional semantic value. Against this, we defend semantic expressivism about epistemic modals: the semantic value of a declarative from this domain is the property of doxastic attitudes it canonically serves to express. In support, we synthesize data from the critical literature on expressivism—largely reflecting interactions between modals and disjunctions—and present a semantic expressivism that readily predicts the data. This contrasts with salient competitors, including: pragmatic expressivism based on domain semantics or dynamic semantics; semantic expressivism à la Moss [2015]; and the bounded relational semantics of Mandelkern [2019].

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Author Profiles

Peter Hawke
Lingnan University
Shane Steinert-Threlkeld
University of Washington

References found in this work

Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.

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