Abstract

Descartes divides his treatment of the theology of the Eucharist into two closely related questions: the problem of real accidents and the problem of real presence. Scholarly work has tended to focus on the first question. Its overrepresentation in the secondary literature is understandable in light of Descartes’s preoccupation with real accidents and his reluctance to take a position on the Eucharistic presence. Despite this imbalance, I take a closer look at Descartes’s views on the second question by collecting some scattered evidence from his published and (in his lifetime) unpublished works. I argue for two related points. First, I show that, read against the theological requirements of his time, Descartes’s explanations of real presence were doomed to failure not because he was unable to cope with the miracle, but because his physics, hampered by necessitarian constraints, lacked the resources to deal with ordinary objects (such as bread and wine and human bodies). Second, Descartes’s sustained attempt to explain the problem of the Eucharist in the face of difficulties is indicative of an important facet of his philosophy. Rather than declaring, as many of his followers would cautiously do, that nothing is impossible for the Almighty, he endeavored to bridge the principles of his new physics with the ordinary perception of the world around us in our daily life.