Abstract

The following doctoral dissertation constitutes a conjoint analysis of the workings of scepticism as contained within Hegel's and Whitehead's respective and contrasting philosophies of 'process'. In it, I hypothesize that for these speculative thinkers, scepticism may be described as the 'mover' of philosophical, religious, and scientific endeavour. ;Part One of the thesis focuses on Hegel's 'initially-idealistic' standpoint of Absolute Idealism as contained in the Logic. I find that for him, scepticism is to be defined as the recognition and negation of finitude. Drawing from Hegel's general distinction of Ancient and Modern forms of scepticism, I argue that scepticism is representative of the moment of 'cancellation' implicit within the dialectical progression of the logical Concept . Subsequently, I trace the role of scepticism as the recognition of finitude with respect to the unfolding of Hegel's criterion of truth characteristic of Absolute Idealism, namely, within the process by which the dialectical opposition of 'idealism' and 'realism' is worked out. ;Part Two concerns Whitehead's 'provisionally-realistic' philosophy of Organism as advanced in Process and Reality. I elucidate the fact that for him, scepticism is the main contributor to the problem of the radical 'bifiurcation' of actualities. Following from an elucidation of the interplay between his ontological principle and the principle of relativity, as well as an analysis of his three modes of perception, I propose that Whitehead's notions of the 'division' and 'decision' of the extensive continuum signify the workings of scepticism. In carrying out this interpretation, I show that 'negative prehensions' constitute the means by which the extensive continuum is divided by the organism, and are the efficient element in the creativity of organisms. And, I trace both the 'realistic' and 'idealistic' activities of 'negative prehensions' with respect to his descriptions of the unfolding of the creative processes of organisms. ;Part Three of the dissertation focuses directly on the ramifications of accepting my initial hypothesis that, in speculative philosophy, scepticism is described as the 'mover' of philosophical, scientific, and religious endeavour. I advance an overall synopsis of the nature and function of scepticism in, and in light of, my study of speculative philosophy. Lastly, I offer a critical response to the radical 'instrumental' scepticism predominant in our era, from both Hegelian and Whiteheadian perspectives