Abstract

In recent discussions of identity, considerable interest has been placed on expressions of the syntactic form "--is the same so & so as--" and their association to the controversial claim that identity is relative. In what follows, I examine the issue of the relativity of identity under two particular scope constraints. The first is that my discussion is confined to the views of Peter Geach, who first proposed the Thesis of the Relativity of Identity, and the emphasis therein is placed on David Wiggins' challenge of the thesis. I argue that Wiggins' opposition to relativity reveals the major difficulties that Geach's doctrine has to face. This particular emphasis of the examination of relativity brings in turn the second constraint. My discussion of the applicability of the relativist's theory is confined to the more limited class of persisting material particulars, standard or ordinary objects, that is, like tables and trees and donkeys. ;In the First Chapter, I delineate the topic by examining Geach's negative and positive views in regards to identity. In contrast Geach's views with those of D. Wiggins, and I draw a distinction between Weak Relativism and Relativism Proper . ;In Chapter Two, I examine Relativism Proper against the charge of incoherence advanced by Wiggins and the upholders of absolute identity. I urge that the issue cannot be decided on purely formal grounds and that the test is the conformity to and explanatory power of the theory in regards to our ontology. ;In Chapter Three, I examine Wiggins' own theory. I show that the theory of individuation advanced under Wiggins' adherence to classical identity under Leibniz's Law has its merits, yet it also suffers from considerable flaws. ;In Chapter Four, I examine what appears as the "best candidate approach" to the relativist's own proposal. I show what constraints the relativist is subjected to, and I employ those as guidelines in the formulation of his own solution which I then sketch