Consciousness and mind in Peirce: distinctions and complementarities

Semiotica 2021 (243):105-128 (2021)
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Abstract

In a brief overview this article discusses that, in the multifaceted field of cognitive sciences, the problem of consciousness and mind is far from being resolved. The article then argues that this problem is worked out in careful detail in Peirce’s work. Intelligence, hence mind, for Peirce, is distinct from consciousness. Without being dissociable, they are, in fact, distinct but complementary. Hence, Peirce’s ideas should be recovered not only for the sake of their relevance, but also because cognitivists have a lot to learn from Peirce.

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