Thorsten Sander
University of Duisburg-Essen
Allocating the burden of proof and intuitions in philosophical disputes.– This paper criticises the view that in philosophical disputes the onus probandi rests on those who advance a position that contradicts our basic intuitions. Such a rule for allocating the burden of proof may be an adequate reconstruction of everyday justification, but is unreasonable in the area of philosophy. In philosophy it is not only difficult to determine the plausibility of a proposition, at the same time contradictory claims may be equally plausible. – In contrast to such common sense proposals I try to show that in philosophical disputes the burden of proof does not depend on the material content of speech acts. A speaker simply bears the burden of proof for a proposition p if he has asserted that p and has agreed to justify it.
Keywords burden of proof   onus probandi  intuition  common sense  presumtion  argumentation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/A:1023281715255
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,163
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Harvard University Press.
Fallacies.Charles Leonard Hamblin - 1970 - London, England: Vale Press.
Making It Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.
The Taming of the True.Neil Tennant - 1997 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

View all 25 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Burden of Proof.Robert Brown - 1970 - American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1):74 - 82.
Burden of Proof Rules in Social Criticism.Juha Räikkä - 1997 - Argumentation 11 (4):463-477.
Shifting the Burden of Proof?Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):86-109.
Compatibilism and the Burden of Proof.Peter van Inwagen - 1980 - Analysis 40 (March):98-100.
Evidence, Proof, and Facts: A Book of Sources.Peter Murphy (ed.) - 2003 - New York ;Oxford University Press.
How Should Philosophy Be Clear? Loaded Clarity, Default Clarity, and Adorno.Nicholas Joll - 2009 - Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary 2009 (146):73–95.
The Weights of Evidence.Dale A. Nance - 2008 - Episteme 5 (3):pp. 267-281.


Added to PP index

Total views
32 ( #356,656 of 2,507,062 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #417,155 of 2,507,062 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes