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Abstract |
Allocating the burden of proof and intuitions in philosophical disputes.– This paper criticises the view that in philosophical disputes the onus probandi rests on those who advance a position that contradicts our basic intuitions. Such a rule for allocating the burden of proof may be an adequate reconstruction of everyday justification, but is unreasonable in the area of philosophy. In philosophy it is not only difficult to determine the plausibility of a proposition, at the same time contradictory claims may be equally plausible. – In contrast to such common sense proposals I try to show that in philosophical disputes the burden of proof does not depend on the material content of speech acts. A speaker simply bears the burden of proof for a proposition p if he has asserted that p and has agreed to justify it.
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Keywords | burden of proof onus probandi intuition common sense presumtion argumentation |
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DOI | 10.1023/A:1023281715255 |
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References found in this work BETA
The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the 'Philosophical Investigations'.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1958 - Oxford, England: Harper & Row.
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Citations of this work BETA
The Burden of Proof in Philosophical Persuasion Dialogue.Conny Rhode - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (3):535-554.
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