Journal of Philosophy 112 (3):159-167 (2015)

Authors
Gil Sagi
University of Haifa
Abstract
The essay discusses a recurrent criticism of the isomorphism-invariance criterion for logical terms, according to which the criterion pertains only to the extension of logical terms, and neglects the meaning, or the way the extension is fixed. A term, so claim the critics, can be invariant under isomorphisms and yet involve a contingent or a posteriori component in its meaning, thus compromising the necessity or apriority of logical truth and logical consequence. This essay shows that the arguments underlying the criticism are flawed since they rely on an invalid inference from the modal or epistemic status of statements in the metalanguage to that of statements in the object-language. The essay focuses on McCarthy’s version of the argument, but refers to Hanson and McGee’s versions as well
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DOI 10.5840/jphil201511239
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References found in this work BETA

Logical Operations.Vann McGee - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (6):567 - 580.
The Concept of Logical Consequence.William H. Hanson - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (3):365-409.
The Idea of a Logical Constant.Timothy McCarthy - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (9):499-523.
The Concept of Logical Consequence.William H. Hanson - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (3):365-409.
The Formal-Structural View of Logical Consequence.Gila Sher - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):241-261.

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Citations of this work BETA

Invariance as a Basis for Necessity and Laws.Gila Sher - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):3945-3974.
Invariance and Logicality in Perspective.Gila Sher - 2021 - In Gil Sagi & Jack Woods (eds.), The Semantic Conception of Logic: Essays on Consequence, Invariance, and Meaning. Cambridge, Britain: Cambridge University Press. pp. 13-34.
Isomorphism Invariance and Overgeneration.Owen Griffiths & A. C. Paseau - 2016 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 22 (4):482-503.
Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.Hasen Khudairi - 2021 - Dissertation, University of St Andrews

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