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Owen Griffiths
London School of Economics
  1.  17
    Is English Consequence Compact?A. C. Paseau & Owen Griffiths - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):188-198.
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, Volume 10, Issue 3, Page 188-198, September 2021.
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  2.  54
    Isomorphism Invariance and Overgeneration.Owen Griffiths & A. C. Paseau - 2016 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 22 (4):482-503.
    The isomorphism invariance criterion of logical nature has much to commend it. It can be philosophically motivated by the thought that logic is distinctively general or topic neutral. It is capable of precise set-theoretic formulation. And it delivers an extension of ‘logical constant’ which respects the intuitively clear cases. Despite its attractions, the criterion has recently come under attack. Critics such as Feferman, MacFarlane and Bonnay argue that the criterion overgenerates by incorrectly judging mathematical notions as logical. We consider five (...)
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  3.  95
    Problems for Logical Pluralism.Owen Griffiths - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (2):170 - 182.
    I argue that Beall and Restall's logical pluralism fails. Beall?Restall pluralism is the claim that there are different, equally correct logical consequence relations in a single language. Their position fails for two, related, reasons: first, it relies on an unmotivated conception of the ?settled core? of consequence: they believe that truth-preservation, necessity, formality and normativity are ?settled? features of logical consequence and that any relation satisfying these criteria is a logical consequence relation. I consider historical evidence and argue that their (...)
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  4.  80
    Harmonious Rules for Identity.Owen Griffiths - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):499-510.
  5.  94
    Formal and Informal Consequence.Owen Griffiths - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):9-20.
    The now standard definition of logical consequence is model-theoretic. Many writers have tried to justify, or to criticise, the model-theoretic definition by arguing that it extensionally captures, or fails to capture, our intuitions about logical consequence, such as its modal character or its being truth-preservation in virtue of form. One popular means of comparing the extension of model-theoretic consequence with some intuitive notion proceeds by adapting Kreisel's squeezing argument. But these attempts get Kreisel wrong, and try to achieve more than (...)
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  6.  84
    Reinflating Logical Consequence.Owen Griffiths - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic (1):1-9.
    Shapiro (Philos Q 61:320–342, 2011) argues that, if we are deflationists about truth, we should be deflationists about logical consequence. Like the truth predicate, he claims, the logical consequence predicate is merely a device of generalisation and more substantial characterisation, e.g. proof- or model-theoretic, is mistaken. I reject his analogy between truth and logical consequence and argue that, by appreciating how the logical consequence predicate is used as well as the goals of proof theory and model theory, we can be (...)
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    Reinflating Logical Consequence.Owen Griffiths - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (1):171-179.
    Shapiro argues that, if we are deflationists about truth, we should be deflationists about logical consequence. Like the truth predicate, he claims, the logical consequence predicate is merely a device of generalisation and more substantial characterisation, e.g. proof- or model-theoretic, is mistaken. I reject his analogy between truth and logical consequence and argue that, by appreciating how the logical consequence predicate is used as well as the goals of proof theory and model theory, we can be deflationists about truth but (...)
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  8.  36
    Introducing Identity.Owen Griffiths & Arif Ahmed - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (6):1449-1469.
    The best-known syntactic account of the logical constants is inferentialism. Following Wittgenstein’s thought that meaning is use, inferentialists argue that meanings of expressions are given by introduction and elimination rules. This is especially plausible for the logical constants, where standard presentations divide inference rules in just this way. But not just any rules will do, as we’ve learnt from Prior’s famous example of tonk, and the usual extra constraint is harmony. Where does this leave identity? It’s usually taken as a (...)
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  9.  63
    Inferentialism and Quantification.Owen Griffiths - 2017 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 58 (1):107-113.
    Logical inferentialists contend that the meanings of the logical constants are given by their inference rules. Not just any rules are acceptable, however: inferentialists should demand that inference rules must reflect reasoning in natural language. By this standard, I argue, the inferentialist treatment of quantification fails. In particular, the inference rules for the universal quantifier contain free variables, which find no answer in natural language. I consider the most plausible natural language correlate to free variables—the use of variables in the (...)
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