Abstract

It is commonly assumed that if one's beliefs are epistemically rational, then those beliefs must at least be consistent with one another. I argue that this assumption is false. I argue that it can be epistemically rational for a person to believe an inconsistent set of statements. I argue further that while one can rationally believe an inconsistent set of statements, one cannot rationally believe a set of statements that she or he knows to be inconsistent. ;In opposition, versions of the "Preface Paradox" and the "Lottery Paradox" seem to show that one can be epistemically rational in believing a set of statements that she or he knows is inconsistent. More specifically, these paradoxes seem to show that one can be epistemically rational in believing a set of statements of the form . ;I carefully examine both paradoxes and argue for solutions that preserve all of the epistemic principles that generate these paradoxes and the assumption that it is not rational to believe a set of statements that is known to be inconsistent