A Defense of Logical Form

Dissertation, Stanford University (1994)
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Abstract

This dissertation attempts to defend the notion of logical form, understood as a level of interpretation where various semantic relationships between syntactically distinct elements are fixed. The argument proceeds by locating a linguistically significant phenomenon, viz., logical truth, and arguing that any adequate account of the phenomenon will necessarily employ logical form. ;The first chapter lays out the possible levels of explanation, gives a number of constraints which any analysis of logical truth must respect, and characterizes the concept of logical form. Chapter Two argues that no purely syntactic account of logical truth can respect all the required constraints jointly. This is accomplished by showing that the semantic relationship between quantifier phrases and other elements of sentences cannot be explained in purely syntactic terms. Other examples of the same phenomenon are also given. ;Chapters Three and Four consider and reject the possibility of a propositional characterization of logical truth. In these chapters I argue that any fully interpretational account of logical truth will overgenerate, misclassifying ordinary truths as logical truths. ;Chapter Five turns to the possibility of giving a meaning-based account of the logical properties. After reviewing the reasons for the failure of previous semantically-based analyses of logical truth, I argue that the kinds of semantic relationships between syntactically distinct elements involved in logical truth are outside the scope of meaning strictly construed. This step completes the argument for the necessity of logical form. ;I conclude the dissertation by pointing out the unsurprising nature of the conclusion. Because logical truths seem to depend crucially on the meanings of certain specific elements, it would be surprising if a purely syntactic account sufficed. Because logical truths must be free of empirical constraints, it would be equally surprising if fully interpretational accounts respected our logical intuitions. Because meanings are those features of expressions which are invariant across uses of expressions, meanings will not always be able to capture the semantic relations between syntactically distinct elements of a sentence. This task is the domain of logical form

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