The T-schema is not a logical truth

Analysis 72 (2):231-239 (2012)
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Abstract

It is shown that the logical truth of instances of the T-schema is incompatible with the formal nature of logical truth. In particular, since the formality of logical truth entails that the set of logical truths is closed under substitution, the logical truth of T-schema instances entails that all sentences are logical truths

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Roy T. Cook
University of St. Andrews

Citations of this work

There is No Paradox of Logical Validity.Roy T. Cook - 2014 - Logica Universalis 8 (3-4):447-467.
A way out of the preface paradox?Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):ant091.
The inexpressibility of validity.Julien Murzi - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):65-81.
Logical Nihilism and the Logic of ‘prem’.Andreas Fjellstad - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Representation and Reality.H. Putnam - 1988 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 52 (1):168-168.
Tarski on truth and logical consequence.John Etchemendy - 1988 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (1):51-79.

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