Akedat Yitzchak a morálne záväzky

Ostium 11 (4) (2015)
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Abstract

How absurd must be our belief for us not to believe it? Assume that the belief is something unshakeable, that nothing could ever happen that would change it. If so, then what if God commanded something really terrible, contrary with our moral sense? This essay deals especially with such cases, where the belief is challenging other our obligations – moral, epistemical etc. The main arguments and statements will be analyzed and discussed in dialogue with philosophers like Kant, Kierkegaard, Derrida, James, Alston, etc.

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