Heeding Wittgenstein on “Understanding” and “Meaning”: A Pragmatist and Concrete Human Psychological Approach in/for Education

Outlines. Critical Practice Studies 16 (1):26-53 (2015)
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Abstract

Over 60 years ago, the influential language philosopher L. Wittgenstein suggested that there is no need to use "understanding" and "meaning" to understand how language works and, in fact, that the two theoretical terms are part of a primitive idea. Today, both remain two of the most frequently used terms in education. The purpose of this paper is to stimulate a discussion about abandoning these terms from the theoretical discourse of education in the way these are commonly used. Case materials from the research literature chosen from a large database on knowing and learning in science are used to exemplify the approach that does not require either concept. Implications are drawn for education research and practice

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Citations of this work

Editorial.Pernille Hviid - 2016 - Outlines. Critical Practice Studies 17 (1):01-04.

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References found in this work

Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.Richard Rorty - 1989 - The Personalist Forum 5 (2):149-152.
Phénoménologie de la perception.M. Merleau-Ponty - 1949 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 5 (4):466-466.
Phenomenologie de la Perception.Aron Gurwitsch - 1950 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10 (3):442-445.

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