Persistence through function preservation

Synthese 192 (1):97-146 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

When do the folk think that material objects persist? Many metaphysicians have wanted a view which fits with folk intuitions, yet there is little agreement about what the folk intuit. I provide a range of empirical evidence which suggests that the folk operate with a teleological view of persistence: the folk tend to intuit that a material object survives alterations when its function is preserved. Given that the folk operate with a teleological view of persistence, I argue for a debunking explanation of folk intuitions, concluding that metaphysicians should dismiss folk intuitions as tied into a benighted view of nature

Similar books and articles

Folk concepts and intuitions: From philosophy to cognitive science.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (11):514-518.
Object persistence in philosophy and psychology.Brian J. Scholl - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (5):563–591.
The persistence of the attitudes.Jerry A. Fodor - 1993 - In Scott M. Christensen & Dale R. Turner (eds.), Folk psychology and the philosophy of mind. Hillsdale, N.J.: L. Erlbaum. pp. 221--246.
Four-Dimensionalist Theories of Persistence.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):671-686.
Dennett’s Theory of the Folk Theory of Consciousness.Justin Sytsma - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):107-130.
Two contrasts: Folk craft vs folk science and belief vs opinion.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 135--148.
Basic logic, k4, and persistence.Wim Ruitenburg - 1999 - Studia Logica 63 (3):343-352.
Faculty before folk.Justin Leiber - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):579-580.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-09-14

Downloads
1,293 (#9,047)

6 months
126 (#30,435)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Rose
Stanford University

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.

View all 59 references / Add more references