Abstract

In this thesis, I critically explicate two themes central to John Hick's thought: the cognitivity of religions and religious pluralism. The first theme runs through all of this writings, while the second is a newer interest. Hick challenged the claim of logical positivism that religious language is meaningless by proposing that such utterances as "God exists" are indeed meaningful, or factual, since they may be verified eschatologically. I argue that this proposal founders on the problem of adequately specifying the eschatological verificandum--that which would count in the eschaton as a verification of the claim "God exists." This outcome is inconsistent with Hick's belief that religious language is cognitive. ;The problem of adequately specifying the eschatological verificandum as well as encounters with people of faiths other than Christianity led Hick to take up the issue of religious pluralism. He called for a Copernican revolution in theology in which Jesus would be replaced by God at the center of the universe of faiths. In response to criticisms of the theocentricity of this proposal, Hick developed a philosophical approach to religious pluralism, which he calls the pluralistic hypothesis. This hypothesis is grounded upon the quasi-Kantian distinction between the ineffable, unknowable Real an sich, or the noumenal Real, and its phenomenal manifestations as the various impersonal and personal conceptions of deity in the religions of the world. However, this hypothesis lends support, contrary to Hick's intentions, to religious noncognitivism, since the noumenal Real, being beyond human experience, is otiose and expendable. ;To avoid this unwanted outcome, I propose a recasting of the pluralistic hypothesis along lines suggested by other concepts that have been central to Hick's thought from the beginning: the cognitive ambiguity of the universe, human cognitive freedom, faith as interpretation, and the rationality of trusting one's experience. I suggest that had Hick developed these ideas rather than inexplicably modelling the pluralistic hypothesis on Kant's First Critique, his recent views on religious pluralism might have been more persuasive than they have proven to be