Constructivism and Realism in Boltzmann’s Thermodynamics’ Atomism

Foundations of Physics 50 (11):1270-1293 (2020)
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Abstract

Ludwig Boltzmann is one of the foremost responsible for the development of modern atomism in thermodynamics. His proposition was revolutionary not only because it brought a new vision for Thermodynamics, merging a statistical approach with Newtonian physics, but also because he produced an entirely new perspective on the way of thinking about and describing physical phenomena. Boltzmann dared to flirt with constructivism and realism simultaneously, by hypothesizing the reality of atoms and claiming an inherent probabilistic nature related to many particles systems. Boltzmann faced criticism from the positivists, who rejected the hypothesis of the atom as a matter of principle, and also from physicists, who rejected the idea of a classical bounded system that does not follow deterministic mechanical laws. We consider that Boltzmann thermodynamics has emerged as a systemic theory that deals with macroscopic bodies using collective variables; it was reformulated to a kinetic theory of gases, and subsequently to statistical mechanics. From the theoretical physical point of view, Boltzmann advocates an approach to thermodynamics based on mechanics and was one of the founders of statistical mechanics, together with ideas by Maxwell, Clausius and Gibbs. Subsequently, statistical mechanics has also influenced the development of quantum mechanics and information theory. Using an evolutionary epistemological perspective as a metaphor to describe the physical entities claimed in Boltzmann propositions, we interpret his work as a selected theory that gained attributes of reality and “survived” during a scientific-contextual competition to be more adapted, in the sense that it was able to better explain physical phenomena, and also generated “descendants”.

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References found in this work

Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.
Objective knowledge: an evolutionary approach.Karl Raimund Popper - 1972 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Genetic epistemology.Jean Piaget - 1970 - New York,: Columbia University Press.
Objective Knowledge.K. R. Popper - 1972 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 4 (2):388-398.

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