Erkenntnis 81 (5):1127-1148 (2016)
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Abstract |
Within the modeling literature, there is often an implicit assumption about the relationship between a given model and a scientific explanation. The goal of this article is to provide a unified framework with which to analyze the myriad relationships between a model and an explanation. Our framework distinguishes two fundamental kinds of relationships. The first is metaphysical, where the model is identified as an explanation or as a partial explanation. The second is epistemological, where the model produces understanding that is related to the explanation of interest. Our analysis reveals that the epistemological relationships are not always dependent on the metaphysical relationships, contrary to what has been assumed by many philosophers of science. Moreover, we identify several importantly different ways that scientific models instantiate these relationships. We argue that our framework provides novel insights concerning the nature of models, explanation, idealization, and understanding.
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DOI | 10.1007/s10670-015-9788-0 |
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References found in this work BETA
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation.James Woodward - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World.Wesley C. Salmon - 1984 - Princeton University Press.
Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World.Michael Weisberg - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science.Carl Gustav Hempel - 1965 - New York: The Free Press.
View all 67 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Counterfactuals and Explanatory Pluralism.Kareem Khalifa, Gabriel Doble & Jared Millson - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (4):1439-1460.
Scientific Understanding and Felicitous Legitimate Falsehoods.Insa Lawler - 2021 - Synthese 198 (7):6859-6887.
Explanatory Schema and the Process of Model Building.Collin Rice, Yasha Rohwer & André Ariew - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4735-4757.
A Defense of Truth as a Necessary Condition on Scientific Explanation.Christopher Pincock - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
View all 12 citations / Add more citations
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