Probabilité et support inductif. Sur le théorème de Popper-Miller

Dialogue 43 (3):499-526 (2004)
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Abstract

In 1983, in an open letter to the journal Nature, Karl Popper and David Miller set forth a particularly strong critical argument which sought to demonstrate the impossibility of inductive probability. Since its publication the argument has faced many criticisms and we argue in this article that they do not reach their objectives. We will first reconstruct the demonstration made by Popper and Miller in their initial article and then try to evaluate the main arguments against it. Although it is possible to conceptualize logically the idea of induction, it is shown that it is not possible on traditional Bayesian grounds.

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References found in this work

In defense of the Popper-Miller argument.Donald Gillies - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (1):110-113.
On the impossibility of inductive probability.Michael Redhead - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):185-191.
When probabilistic support is inductive.Alberto Mura - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (2):278-289.
A bayesian analysis of excess content and the localisation of support.Colin Howson & Allan Franklin - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (4):425-431.
Dualling: A critique of an argument of Popper and Miller.J. Michael Dunn & Geoffrey Hellman - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (2):220-223.

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