Presumptuous or pluralistic presumptions of innocence? Methodological diagnosis towards conceptual reinvigoration
Synthese 198 (9):8901-8932 (2020)
AbstractThis article is a contribution to interdisciplinary scholarship addressing the presumption of innocence, especially interdisciplinary conversations between philosophers and jurists. Terminological confusion and methodological traps and errors notoriously beset academic literature addressing the presumption of innocence and related concepts, such as evidentiary presumptions, and the burden and standard of proof in criminal trials. This article is diagnostic, in the sense that its primary objective is to highlight the assumptions—in particular, the disciplinary assumptions—implicit in influential contributions to debates on the presumption of innocence. It advocates a methodologically pluralistic approach, according to which definitions of the presumption of innocence are necessarily sensitive to purpose and method. These relationships and their implications are not always appreciated, and are seldom explicitly elucidated. Notably, philosophers routinely treat the presumption of innocence as epistemic, evidentiary or otherwise featuring directly in practical reasoning. This article identifies jurisprudential and practical reasons why legal scholars and practitioners concerned with criminal procedure and evidence should reject evidentiary interpretations of the presumption of innocence. By encouraging finer-grained engagement with the history and institutional details of common law procedural traditions, the article aims to show why legal scholars might think that philosophical approaches to the presumption of innocence are already methodologically-loaded and, for our purposes, address the wrong questions with deficient concepts.
Similar books and articles
Who is Presumed Innocent of What by Whom?Carl-Friedrich Stuckenberg - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (2):301-316.
Assuming that the Defendant Is Not Guilty: The Presumption of Innocence in the German System of Criminal Justice.Thomas Weigend - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (2):285-299.
Loss of Innocence in Common Law Presumptions.Paul Roberts - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (2):317-336.
Rethinking the presumption of innocence.Victor Tadros - 2006 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 (2):193-213.
The Prosecutor and the Presumption of Innocence.Richard L. Lippke - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (2):337-352.
Racial Profiling and the Presumption of Innocence.Peter DeAngelis - 2014 - Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy (1):43-58.
Preface: The Presumption of Innocence.Liz Campbell, James Chalmers & Antony Duff - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (2):283-284.
Surveillance Technologies, Wrongful Criminalisation, and the Presumption of Innocence.Katerina Hadjimatheou - 2017 - Philosophy and Technology 30 (1):39-54.
The Right to be Presumed Innocent.Hamish Stewart - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (2):407-420.
The Juror, the Citizen, and the Human Being: The Presumption of Innocence and the Burden of Judgment. [REVIEW]Sherman J. Clark - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (2):421-429.
The Ideal of the Presumption of Innocence.Victor Tadros - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (2):449-467.
Criminal and Procedural Fairness: Some Challenges to the Presumption of Innocence. [REVIEW]Magnus Ulväng - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (2):469-484.
Social Engineering as an Infringement of the Presumption of Innocence: The Case of Corporate Criminality. [REVIEW]Douglas Husak - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (2):353-369.
The Presumption of Innocence in the Trial Setting.Richard L. Lippke - 2015 - Ratio Juris 28 (2):159-179.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
The reasonable doubt standard as inference to the best explanation.Hylke Jellema - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):949-973.
References found in this work
Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology.Larry Laudan - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.
Presumption and the Practices of Tentative Cognition.Nicholas Rescher - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.