In Jon Mandle & David A. Reidy (eds.),
A Companion to Rawls. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 395–412 (
2013)
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Abstract
John Rawls is an influential critic of standard utilitarianism, which he classifies as “teleological” in the sense that it specifies utility as the sole rational end independent of any moral concepts or principles and then maintains that morally right actions are those which maximize this independent good. In Rawls′ view, John Stuart Mill relies on a pluralistic conception of happiness together with certain fundamental principles of human psychology to construct an extraordinary utilitarianism that gives absolute priority to a liberal basic institutional structure similar to that of justice as fairness. This chapter shows that Rawls’ interpretation is problematic even on its own terms. According to the author, Rawls has opened up the possibility of deontological utilitarianisms which could serve as reasonable members of a democratic consensus. Indeed, perhaps Mill may still be properly interpreted as a deontological utilitarian, despite his avowed hedonism.