On the philosophical significance of what we say

Philosophical Studies 17 (1-2):21 - 27 (1966)
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Abstract

The author attempts to answer critics of "ordinary language philosophy." he does this by offering examples of the mismatch of language and reality. A spade is a spade but we often do not call a spade a spade. He concludes that what we call something is an important consideration in determining what that thing is. And this fact points out the usefulness of analysis of ordinary language. (staff)

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References found in this work

Must we mean what we say?Stanley Cavell - 1964 - In Vere Claiborne Chappell (ed.), Ordinary language: essays in philosophical method. New York: Dover Publications. pp. 172 – 212.
On the verification of statements about ordinary language.Benson Mates - 1964 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1 (1-4):161 – 171.

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