Modeling multiscale patterns: active matter, minimal models, and explanatory autonomy

Synthese 200 (6):1-35 (2022)
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Abstract

Both ecologists and statistical physicists use a variety of highly idealized models to study active matter and self-organizing critical phenomena. In this paper, I show how universality classes play a crucial role in justifying the application of highly idealized ‘minimal’ models to explain and understand the critical behaviors of active matter systems across a wide range of scales and scientific fields. Appealing to universality enables us to see why the same minimal models can be used to explain and understand behaviors across these different systems despite drastic differences in the causes and mechanisms responsible for the behaviors of interest. After analyzing these cases in detail, I argue that accounts that focus on identifying common causes or mechanisms in order to explain patterns are unable to accommodate these cases. In contrast, I argue that the justification for using these minimal models is that they are within the same universality class as real systems whose causes and mechanisms are known to be different. I also use these cases to identify several different kinds of explanatory autonomy that have important implications for how scientists ought to approach the modeling of multiscale phenomena.

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Collin Rice
Colorado State University

Citations of this work

Design principles as minimal models.Wei Fang - 2024 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 105 (C):50-58.

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References found in this work

Explaining the brain: mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience.Carl F. Craver - 2007 - New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press.
Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation.Michael Strevens - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Idealization and the Aims of Science.Angela Potochnik - 2017 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
The New Mechanical Philosophy.Stuart Glennan - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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