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Explanatory schema and the process of model building
Synthese 196 (11):4735-4757 (2019)
Abstract
In this paper, we argue that rather than exclusively focusing on trying to determine if an idealized model fits a particular account of scientific explanation, philosophers of science should also work on directly analyzing various explanatory schemas that reveal the steps and justification involved in scientists’ use of highly idealized models to formulate explanations. We develop our alternative methodology by analyzing historically important cases of idealized statistical modeling that use a three-step explanatory schema involving idealization, mathematical operation, and explanatory interpretation.Author Profiles
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Citations of this work
Minimal phenomenal experience.Thomas Metzinger - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-44.
Model Explanation Versus Model-Induced Explanation.Insa Lawler & Emily Sullivan - 2021 - Foundations of Science 26 (4):1049-1074.
How to Reconcile a Unified Account of Explanation with Explanatory Diversity.Collin Rice & Yasha Rohwer - 2020 - Foundations of Science 26 (4):1025-1047.
Statistical Autonomous Explanations and the Patterns of Nature: A Modified Account.Travis Holmes & Andre Ariew - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Unifying statistically autonomous and mathematical explanations.Travis L. Holmes - 2021 - Biology and Philosophy 36 (3):1-22.
References found in this work
Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation.James F. Woodward - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World.Wesley C. Salmon - 1984 - Princeton University Press.
Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation.Michael Strevens - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Explaining the brain: mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience.Carl F. Craver - 2007 - New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press.
Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World.Michael Weisberg - 2013 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
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