Deleuze's Bergsonism: Multiplicity, Intuition, and the Virtual

Kritike 10 (2):152-190 (2016)
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Abstract

This paper aims to explicate Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy of Bergsonism. Specifically, I expound on Deleuze’s reconstruction of Bergson’s concepts of intuition, the virtual, and duration. Bergson’s formulation of these concepts is critically informed by traditional science and metaphysics’ insular obsession with quantitative differences, succession, homogeneity etc. In the eyes of Deleuze, this preoccupation redounds to the failure in perceiving real differences— the realm of qualitative difference, duration, intuition etc. Accordingly, real difference and the creative differentiation of its corollary concepts form part of Deleuze’s Transcendental or Virtual Empiricism. Ultimately, tracing Deleuze’s intellectual indebtedness to Bergson’s differential philosophy does not only disclose his own way of overcoming or antagonizing traditional science and metaphysics, but more importantly, it opens us to a life of self-reflexivity, pure becoming, and infinite durations.

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Raniel Reyes
University of Santo Tomas

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