Brains enjoy a bodily life. Therefore animals are subjects with a point of view. Yet, coding betrays an anthropomorphic bias: we can, therefore they must. Here I propose a reformulation of Brette's question that emphasizes organismic perception, cautioning for misinterpretations based on external ideal-observer accounts. Theoretical ethology allows computational neuroscience to understand brains from the perspective of their owners.

Despite the triumphant rhetoric of mechanistic materialism, current biology has no shortage of unsolved fundamental problems. In 1981, seeking a way forward, Rupert Sheldrake proposed the hypothesis of “formative causation” as a unifying organizing principle of life. Expanding the concept of morphogenetic fields, Sheldrake posited a spatio‐temporal connection termed “morphic resonance” whereby the more often a self‐organizing process takes place, the easier it will be for it to take place in the future. After initial acclaim, his project was quickly met (...) with dogmatic skepticism, dismissed as scientific heresy, and ultimately ignored. Forty years later, the experimental implications of his ideas remain largely untested. Visionary or not, Sheldrake's case illustrates the conceptual resistance of the scientific enterprise to revise its own deepest theoretical commitments. Beyond career‐building selection pressures, young researchers need to be presented with the major questions in their field and encouraged to entertain radically alternative points of view. Science is what scientists make of it. (shrink)

Not only does Hoffman claim that we do not see reality as it is, but that unperceived brains, trees and moons do not exist. His “interface theory of perception” is a peculiar blend of metaphorical ontology (objects are icons, space-time is a desktop) and mathematical modelling (the game-theoretical argument that fitness trumps truth. Conflating abstractions with concrete experience, evolution is used to refute everything (including evolution itself. Hoffman’s sweeping iconoclasm then lands where it took off: addressing the problem of consciousness. (...) After arguing against reality, he will tell us what it is. (shrink)

Neuroscience needs theory. Ideas without data are blind, and yet mechanisms without concepts are empty. Friston's free energy principle paradigmatically illustrates the power and pitfalls of current theoretical biology. Mighty metaphors, turned into mathematical models, can become mindless metaphysics. Then, seeking to understand everything in principle, we may explain nothing in practice. Life can't live in a map.

A century ago Henri Bergson was a world-wide celebrity. However, after the world wars his philosophy had already fallen into disfavor, disdain and oblivion. Prominent molecular biologists claimed to have hammered the final nail in the coffin of vitalism. Francis Crick himself, with prophetic hubris, called any future vitalist a crank. Things were not much different amongst analytic philosophers who, more concerned with clarity than precision, saw in Bergson’s works hardly more than poetry and mysticism. In fact, ‘vitalism’ became a (...) one-word argument against itself. And yet, ironically, vitalism refused to die. Half a century ago, Gilles Deleuze wrote a seminal interpretation of Bergson’s philosophy. After providing a concrete articulation of Bergson’s method of intuition, Deleuze studied the progression of Bergson’s concepts of duration, memory, and the élan, and paired them with his own concepts of multiplicity, the virtual and differentiation. Now, in a lucid and crisp book, Craig Lundy unpacks Deleuze’s Bergsonism. Not only does the book afford a better grasp of Bergson’s genius, but it also allows us to trace the origin of some key notions in Deleuze’s philosophy. Moreover, Lundy’s effort is particularly opportune in the context of the current revival of Bergson’s thought. In a time when it is becoming increasingly strenuous to cash the promissory notes of scientific materialism, reductionism and mechanicism, Lundy’s Deleuze’s Bergsonism represents an invaluable opportunity to better understand the philosopher of time and life par excellence. (shrink)