Philosophical Disagreement: An Essay Towards Orientational Pluralism in Metaphilosophy

Review of Metaphysics 32 (2):217 - 251 (1978)
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Abstract

TIME and again over the centuries, philosophers have dwelt with dismay on the inability of their discipline to lay to rest the disagreements of the past and to reach fixed and settled conclusions. Philosophers have often cast envious sidelong glances at the sciences, with their demonstrated capacity to solve the problems and settle the controversies of the field, and to yield a continually increasing number of established findings with respect to which a general consensus can be achieved.

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2011-05-29

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Nicholas Rescher
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

Would Disagreement Undermine Progress?Finnur Dellsén, Insa Lawler & James Norton - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (3):139-172.
Kant’s Metaphilosophy.Michael Lewin - 2021 - Open Philosophy 4 (1):292-310.
Philosophy and other disciplines.Sven Ove Hansson - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):472-483.

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