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Minimalists about truth can (and should) be epistemicists, and it helps if they are revision theorists too
In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Clarendon Press (2005)
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Citations of this work
Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
Restricting the T‐schema to Solve the Liar.Jared Warren - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):238-258.
Conceivability, Minimalism and the Generalization Problem.Sergi Oms - 2019 - Dialogue 58 (2):287-297.
References found in this work
Deflationary truth and the liar.Keith Simmons - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):455-488.
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