CHOICE WITHOUT PREFERENCE. A Study of the History and of the Logic of the Problem of “Buridan's Ass”

Kant Studien 51 (1-4):142-175 (1960)
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10.1515/kant.1960.51.1-4.142

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Choice without preference. A study of the history and of the logic of the problem of “Buridan's ass”.Nicholas Rescher - 1960 - Kant Studien 51 (1-4):142-175.
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Nicholas Rescher
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