Abstract

This dissertation presents the Scottish philosopher, David Hume , as a political conservative by showing how he developed a comprehensive philosophy of human nature which aimed to teach modesty, humility, and judiciousness in our thinking. Although Hume was a sceptic, scepticism was but one aspect of his philosophy of human nature. To view Hume as a purely negative sceptic is inaccurate and will not lead one to understand why he was politically conservative. That understanding can come only from looking at his rejection of moral scepticism, at his naturalistic theory that instincts, propensities, passions and sentiments are the most influential part of the mind, and at the independent role which he reserves for reflective reasoning. Although Hume allows no place for metaphysical ideas in politics, his own political thought is firmly grounded in a general concept of mind and morals. Hume developed a theory of knowledge, of the passions, and of morals which led him to assert that justice is a purely practical naturalistic matter, not a truth discovered by reason in the nature of things, and to develop an account of allegiance to government in opposition to the theories of natural rights and of the social contract, the chief forms of of political rationalism in Hume's age. Because of these views of justice and allegiance, Hume distrusted all violent innovations, distrusted what he called "enthusiasm" and "political projectors," had a fine feeling for the complexities and historical contingencies of government, and denied that human nature was perfectible or that utopias could be established. Unlike John Locke's political philosophy, which is largely separate from his epistemology, David Hume's specifically political ideas are an integral part of his philosophical system as a whole and are incomprehensible without understanding his theories of knowledge, of the passions, and of morals. The dissertation regards Hume's prudent and conservative political philosophy with favor, but regards his epistemology and moral theory as weak