Philosophical Psychology 34 (5):611-636 (2021)

Authors
Paul Rehren
Utrecht University
Abstract
Several philosophers and psychologists have argued that evidence of moral framing effects shows that many of our moral judgments are unreliable. However, all previous empirical work on moral framing effects has used between-subject experimental designs. We argue that between-subject designs alone do not allow us to accurately estimate the extent of moral framing effects or to properly evaluate the case from framing effects against the reliability of our moral judgments. To do better, we report results of our new within-subject study on four types of moral framing effects, and we discuss the implications of our findings for the reliability of moral judgments. Overall, our results strengthen the evidence from moral framing effects against the reliability of some of our moral judgments.
Keywords framing effects  moral judgment  unreliability  between-subject design  within-subject design
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515089.2021.1914328
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,160
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Weirdest People in the World?Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine & Ara Norenzayan - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):61-83.

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Moral Intuition, Strength, and Metacognition.Dario Cecchini - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-25.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects?James Andow - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):115-141.
Consent and the Problem of Framing Effects.Jason Hanna - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (5):517-531.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-04-20

Total views
37 ( #304,968 of 2,499,308 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #53,227 of 2,499,308 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes