Emotion and Reliability in Moral Psychology

Emotion Review 3 (3):288-289 (2011)
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Abstract

Instead of arguing about whether moral judgments are based on emotion or reason, moral psychologists should investigate the reliability of moral judgments by checking rates of framing effects in different kinds of moral judgments under different conditions by different people.

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References found in this work

Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Noûs 11 (4):421-430.
Thought.Gilbert Harman & Laurence BonJour - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (2):256.

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