Getting the vehicle moving

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):165-166 (1999)
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Abstract

O'Brien & Opie present an attractive alternative to the popular but flawed computational process approach to conscious awareness. Their “vehicle” theory, however, is itself seriously flawed by overstrict allegiance to the notion that explicit representation and stability are defining hallmarks of consciously experienced neural activity patterns. Including reentrant interactions among time-varying patterns in different brain areas can begin to repair their theory.

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