Vehicle, process, and hybrid theories of consciousness

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):303-305 (2004)
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Abstract

Martínez-Manrique contends that we overlook a possible nonconnectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. We argue that the position he develops is better understood as a hybrid vehicle/process theory. We assess this theory and in doing so clarify the commitments of both vehicle and process theories of consciousness.

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Author Profiles

Gerard O'Brien
University of Adelaide
Jonathan Opie
University of Adelaide

Citations of this work

The disunity of consciousness.Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):378-95.

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References found in this work

On the proper treatment of connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.
When is information explicitly represented?David Kirsh - 1990 - In Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press.
When is Information Explicitly Represented?David Kirsh - 1992 - The Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science:340-365.
A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience.Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.

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