Presentists may say goodbye to A-properties

Analysis 72 (2):270-276 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Philosophers of time say that if presentism is true (i.e. if reality is comprised solely of presently existing things), then a complete description of reality must contain tensed terms, such as ‘was’, ‘presently is’ and ‘will be’. I counter this viewpoint by explaining how the presentist may de-tense our talk about times. I argue, furthermore, that, since the A-theory of time denies the success of any such de-tensing strategy, presentism is not a version of the A-theory – contrary to the popular opinion

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,271

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Time for Distribution?Jonathan Tallant & David Ingram - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):264-270.
No Time Travel for Presentists.Steven D. Hales - 2010 - Logos and Episteme 1 (2):353-360.
Travelling in A- and B- Time.Theodore Sider - 2005 - The Monist 88 (3):329-335.
Tensed Supervenience: A No‐Go for Presentism.Sam Baron - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):383-401.
Truthmaking for presentists.Ross Cameron - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 6:55-100.
Presentism and the grounding of truth.Alex Baia - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):341-356.
Persistence and presentism.Dean W. Zimmerman - 1996 - Philosophical Papers 25 (2):115-126.
Presentism, persistence and composition.Ernâni Magalhães - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):509-523.
Presentism and the objection from being-supervenience.Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):485-497.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-02-23

Downloads
176 (#107,249)

6 months
26 (#109,051)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Joshua Rasmussen
Azusa Pacific University

Citations of this work

Defining Existence Presentism.Jonathan Charles Tallant - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):479-501.
Presentism and the Myth of Passage.Lisa Leininger - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):724-739.
Presentism Remains.Jonathan Tallant - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):409-435.
Presentism and Times as Propositions.Luca Banfi & Daniel Deasy - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):725-743.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Presentist’s Dilemma.Ulrich Meyer - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (3):213-225.
What is presentism?Franklin Mason - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):107-128.

Add more references