The purpose of Parts and Places, say Casati and Varzi in their introduction, is to construct “a theory of our spatial competence,” a theory that will lay bare how we conceive of space and the things that lie within it. Its purpose, then, is psychological, not metaphysical. Its object of study is not space. It is not the things that lie within it. Rather its object of study is us. In this regard, Parts and Places is at best a mixed (...) success. (shrink)

Presentism has received much scrutiny of late, yet little has been said of its definition. Many assume that it means simply that all that exists, exists at present. However, this definition will not do. It is defective in a multiplicity of ways. I consider and reject each of a number of intuitive ways in which to amend it. Each carries us a bit closer to our goal, but not until the end do we reach a definition that is wholly satisfactory. (...) The final definition has this remarkable feature: it has us posit abstracta of two kinds, namely, times and haecceities. (shrink)

In his ‘Could Extended Objects Be Made Out of Simple Parts?: An Argument for “Atomless Gunk’’, Dean Zimmerman defends the claim that no physical object has a complete decomposition into simples but instead has among its parts a piece of ‘atomless gunk’ His argument for this claim rests in part upon a theory of the impenetrability of physical objects. In that theory, Zimmerman distinguishes ‘[t]he sort of impenetrability that is a part of the concept of’ a physical object from ‘a (...) power to resist the pressure of other objects’. He says that impenetrability is but ‘an essential inability’ of two physical objects to occupy one and the same region of space, an essential inability that is not a power of one physical object to exert repulsive forces on others in its vicinity. I argue that this theory of impenetrability is false and that Zimmerman's argument for the existence of ‘atomless gunk’ fails. (shrink)

Two things are often said about Aristotle's treatment of time in the Physics. First, that Aristotle's considered view of time is intrinsically tied to a language of temporal passage heavily dependent on the A-series. As such Aristotle's understanding of time is plagued with the perplexities that the A-series generates. Second, that the series of puzzles that Aristotle treats in IV.10, leading to the conclusion that time is non-existent, are left unanswered by Aristotle. Instead after presenting the puzzles having to do (...) with whether time is, Aristotle cannot move fast enough to his treatment of what time is, leaving the puzzles unresolved. This paper looks at these two issues together. The thesis is that the puzzles about the existence of time discussed by Aristotle at IV.10 are generated by a particularly naive version of the A-theory. Further, although Aristotle's answer to what time is incorporates elements of an A-theory of time, it manages to avoid just those particular puzzles discussed in IV.10 leading to the conclusion of time's non-existence. (shrink)

Debate about the nature of time has been dominated by discussion of two issues: the reality of absolute time and the reality of A-series. We argue that Aristotle adopts a form of the A-theory entailing a denial of the reality of absolute time. Furthermore, Aristotle's denial of absolute time is linked to a denial of the reality of pure temporal becoming, namely, the idea that the now moves through a fixed continuum along which events are arranged in chronological order. We (...) show that the puzzles discussed by Aristotle in IV:10 of the Physics are generated by this view of time and that Aristotle's own theory of time, according to which changes are used to measure one another, avoids these problems. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aristotle as A-Theorist:Overcoming the Myth of PassageJacqueline Mariña and Franklin MasonTwo things are often said about Aristotle's treatment of time in the Physics. First, that Aristotle's considered view of time is intrinsically tied to a language of temporal passage heavily dependent on the A-series.1 As such Aristotle's understanding of time is plagued with the perplexities that the A-series generates.2 Second, that the series of puzzles that Aristotle treats in (...) IV. 10, leading to the conclusion that time is non-existent, are left unanswered by Aristotle.3 [End Page 169] Instead, after presenting the puzzles having to do with whether time is, Aristotle cannot move fast enough to his treatment of what time is, leaving the puzzles unresolved.4 In this paper we would like to look at these two issues together. Our thesis is that the puzzles about the existence of time discussed by Aristotle at IV.10 are generated by a particularly naïve version of the A-theory. Further, although Aristotle's answer to what time is incorporates elements of an A-theory of time, it manages to avoid just those particular puzzles discussed in IV. 10 leading to the conclusion of time's non-existence.Our discussion is divided into three parts. First we provide an analysis of the puzzles raised by means of the commonplace ideas () mentioned by Aristotle at 217 b 31. This analysis will reveal that the puzzles are the consequence of a hypostatization of time, that is, the naïve notion that time has metaphysical status in its own right, in the way that a substance has, for instance. The hypostatization of time is what results when we ask questions concerning when the now exists and when the now ceases to be. We argue that these are questions that arise when the present is thought of as something that becomes, that is, that surges forward through history. Moreover, the problems brought to light by these puzzles are not left unresolved by Aristotle. Rather, Aristotle's considered view of time, piggybacking as it does on substances and their changes, would clearly avoid such a reification of time and hence the problems generated by it. In the second part of the paper we discuss Aristotle's view of the substrate of time, namely change, and show why Aristotle argues that change must be thought of as following a magnitude. Using our discussion in section 2 as our basis, in the third and final section we discuss the [End Page 170] significance of Aristotle's theory of time as that which results when we measure one change by another. Our discussion in sections 2 and 3 is geared towards an exploration of how Aristotle's own theory avoids a commitment to pure temporal becoming as real, that is, the idea that the now moves through a fixed continuum along which events are arranged in chronological order. The fact that this denial is an implication of his theory is closely linked to Aristotle's solution of the aporias in IV.10.1. TheThe arguments presented in IV.10 concern difficulties arising from common sense views of time. We will argue that these puzzles are the result of a reification of time. Resulting from naïve conceptions of time, they dissolve once these have been replaced by Aristotle's ensuing demystified account of the nature of time. Two things stand out as important in this regard. First, Aristotle's definition of time involves number, and as Aristotle notes at 223 a 22 ff., number exists only insofar as there is a soul that counts. That Aristotle conceives of time as involving a soul that counts should alert to us to the fact that Aristotle does not conceive of time as something that, of itself, marches along a preexisting continuum, first privileging one moment and then another. Second, insofar as the substratum of time is that which is countable in the before and after in change, time is, as it were, a characteristic of substances undergoing change and is not an explanatory condition of their changing. Time is not a necessary condition of change; but rather... (shrink)

The purpose of Parts and Places, say Casati and Varzi in their introduction, is to construct “a theory of our spatial competence,” a theory that will lay bare how we conceive of space and the things that lie within it. Its purpose, then, is psychological, not metaphysical. Its object of study is not space. It is not the things that lie within it. Rather its object of study is us. In this regard, Parts and Places is at best a mixed (...) success. (shrink)

Presentism—the thesis that only those things that are present exist—seems to face an insurmountable barrier in the Special Theory ofRelativity (STR). For the STR entails that simultaneity, and so the present, are relative to inertial frame. But if the present is the real and the present is relative, so too is in the real relative. But this cannot be. The real is absolute. But what is the Presentist to do? I suggest that she craft an alternative to the STR that (...) is empirically equivalent to it but makes rooms for a present, and a real, that are absolute. (shrink)

Not all beings matter from the moral point of view. But how are we to distinguish those that do from those that do not? Some argue that mere sentience alone makes a being matter morally. Others argue that an ability to set ends and thus to place value on those ends is necessary for moral value. I break from these views and argue for a radically more inclusive account of the source of moral value. What makes a being matter morally (...) is that it has a good of its own. (shrink)

I suggest that Carter and Hestevold's arguments for L1 and L2 can be given a chance to succeed if (i) everywhere in them that we find an occurrence of the thesis Transient Time we replace it with an occurrence of Presentism, and (ii) everywhere in them that we find an occurrence of the thesis Static Time we replace it with an occurrence of Presentism's denial. I'm fairly confident that their arguments for L1 would succeed if these changes were made. (If (...) Presentism is true, nothing has temporal parts, for some at least of the temporal parts of a thing extended in time must be past or future. But if nothing has temporal parts, Endurance must be true.) I'm less confident that their arguments for L2 would succeed if those changes were made. But if the changes that I suggest are not made, the arguments for L1 and L2 certainly fail. (shrink)