Abstract

The central objective of this essay is to demonstrate the main problems concerning Robert Alexy’s theory of legal principles. The debate on legal principles has achieved one of the most important scientific constructions on Robert Alexy’s work. Principles are one of the main important arguments on disputing legal positivism, once jurists have been using them as “tools” that conduct moral justifications throughout legal practice. At least, this is the interpretation of Robert Alexy’s legal philosophy. Stating out as one of the finest legal theorists, Robert Alexy conceives legal principles as norms different in their structure from legal rules. That distinction, among others, allows Robert Alexy to understand the concept of Law as a non-positivist concept.However, my intent is not to analyse all the points with reference to legal principles, but to elucidate why, in my opinion, Robert Alexy’s structural definition of legal principles cannot be accepted. Firstly, I shall try to explain, in a few words, the main foundations of Robert Alexy’s theory of Law, as a presupposition of his conception of legal principles; secondly, I will try to demonstrate why his primarily version of the theory of legal principles cannot be supported; thirdly, I will try to explain why the second version of his theory of legal principles is, however, incoherent.