It is argued that the current policy of the British Medical Association (BMA) on conscientious objection is not aligned with recent human rights developments. These grant a right to conscientious objection to doctors in many more circumstances than the very few recognised by the BMA. However, this wide-ranging right may be overridden if the refusal to accommodate the conscientious objection is proportionate. It is shown that it is very likely that it is lawful to refuse to accommodate conscientious objections that (...) would result in discrimination of protected groups. It is still uncertain, however, in what particular circumstances the objection may be lawfully refused, if it poses risks to the health and safety of patients. The BMA's policy has not caught up with these human rights developments and ought to be changed. (shrink)

This paper argues for a theory of the rule of law that is inclusive of sentient non-human animals. It critiques the rule of law theories of Fuller, Waldron, and Allan, by showing that their theories presuppose that the legal subject is a person who can be guided by legal norms. This unduly excludes non-human animals, as well as certain humans who do not have rational capacities. If we view the basic idea of the rule of law as restraining arbitrary power, (...) then rule of law theories need to give an account of who can be a potential victim of such power. Non-human animals and humans, whether endowed with rational capacities or not, can all be victims of arbitrary power. So, we need a new rule of law theory which is inclusive of all sentient animals, humans and non-human alike. This paper sets out such an inclusive theory. (shrink)

Between Institutional and Moral Discourse: On Alexy's Legal Philosophy. A review of Matthias Klatt, Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy.

Volume 10, Issue 4, December 2019, Page 588-596.

Volume 10, Issue 4, December 2019, Page 588-596.