Abstract

Naïve Realism claims that the Phenomenal Character of perception is constituted by the mind-independent objects one perceives. According to this view, the Phenomenal Character of perception is object-dependent: experiences of different objects have different Phenomenal Characters, even if those objects are qualitatively identical. Proponents of Naïve Realism often defend this conception by arguing that it is necessary to accommodate the cognitive role of perceptual experience. John Campbell has presented the most influential version of this argument, according to which only an object-dependent conception of the Phenomenal Character of experience can explain its epistemic role—how (conscious) perception ‘justifies’ the patterns of inference that reflect our conception of mind-independence. In this paper, I argue that Campbell’s argument is unsound. First, I reconstruct the relevant patterns and argue that, independently of one’s conception of Phenomenal Character, perceptual experience does not ‘justify’ them in the way Campbell intends—by making their validity transparent to the subject. Second, I suggest that perception justifies those patterns by justifying their premises. I argue that a Representationalist, object-independent conception of its Phenomenal Character is at least as well suited as an object-dependent one to explain how this is possible. This undermines one of the main motivations to endorse a Naïve Realist, object-dependent account of the Phenomenal Character of perception.