Kant on the Object-Dependence of Intuition and Hallucination

Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):486-508 (2015)
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Abstract

Against a view currently popular in the literature, it is argued that Kant was not a niıve realist about perceptual experience. Naive realism entails that perceptual experience is object-dependent in a very strong sense. In the first half of the paper, I explain what this claim amounts to and I undermine the evidence that has been marshalled in support of attributing it to Kant. In the second half of the paper, I explore in some detail Kant’s account of hallucination and argue that no such account is available to someone who thinks that veridical perceptual experience is object-dependent in the naive realist sense. Kant’s theory provides for a remarkably sophisticated, bottom-up explanation of the phenomenal character of hallucinatory episodes and is crucial for gaining a proper understanding of his model of the mind and its place in nature.

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Andrew Stephenson
University of Southampton

Citations of this work

Manifest Reality: Kant's Idealism and His Realism.Lucy Allais - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Kant’s Modal Metaphysics.Nicholas Frederick Stang - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Kant’s Account of Cognition.Eric Watkins & Marcus Willaschek - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (1):83-112.
Naïve Realism in Kantian Phrase.Anil Gomes - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):529-578.
A system of rational faculties: Additive or transformative?Karl Schafer - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):918-936.

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References found in this work

The representational character of experience.David Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
Critique of pure reason.Immanuel Kant - 2007 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Late modern philosophy: essential readings with commentary. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 449-451.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99-109.
Perception and Reason.Bill Brewer - 1999 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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