Abstract

Humanitarian reason is not the exclusive province of humanitarians. Its fundamental orientation is the rejection of inaction when faced with the suffering of others, for to do nothing makes one an accomplice to their plight. Prior to and independently of humanitarian solidarity with the suffering of others, this identification of passivity and complicity is a recurrent theme in existential phenomenology after the Holocaust. Jaspers, Arendt, Sartre, and Levinas all recognize passivity as complicity, and endorse different ethical positions in opposition to this dilemma. ;This study combines philosophical analysis with an applied critique of humanitarian action in order to detail how humanitarian reason is a contemporary, global expression of this moral logic: distant others are dying, and to remain passive and silent is intolerable. ;Ironically, perhaps, there are unethical consequences that follow from directly intervening in the tragedy of others in order to help them. After all, concern for others' suffering is one thing, but terminating it at its source is quite another. However, to argue that the humanitarian response to suffering can cause more harm than good does not mean that humanitarianism should be abandoned. It is not the motivational content of humanitarian reason that elicits our criticism and concern, but the consequences that follow from its practice of moral intervention. ;The two forms of global solidarity examined here, Third Worldism and international humanitarianism, stem from a rejection of passivity before the suffering of others. In their mobilization, they are informed by the practice of charity and its origins in the tradition of humanism. These additional influences are largely to blame for the unethical consequences of their mode of engagement. ;Because humanitarianism is based in charity, the man-made, often political sources of local suffering are "de-politicized": the political causes of unrest and tragedy are not targeted by humanitarian assistance. Further, charity implies that generosity alone is sufficient to solve the problems of others. Charity thus obscures the political, and in the end obstructs justice. Related is the internationalization of any global response to distant suffering: local actors risk seeing their responsibilities usurped by international intervention in their affairs. ;If humanitarianism is to address the sources of suffering instead of merely alleviating its symptoms, it will have to pursue justice. This will require a break with "humanity," the collective ideal enshrined in human rights conventions, international humanitarian law, and the United Nations. To break with humanity means distinguishing between the guilty and the innocent, thereby re-politicizing the sources of suffering. Humanitarianism must therefore understand itself as a purely partisan mobilization on behalf of others who cannot represent themselves, and not as global solidarity or other form of ethical universalism